ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING +

The following 6th A4P+ Progress Report was produced by the Office of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. It is the result of a biannual reporting exercise in which United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping missions and relevant departments based at UN Headquarters contribute. The report speaks to challenges and progress made through the UN's efforts to advance A4P+ and strengthen UN Peacekeeping more broadly. The report covers the period between May and October 2024 and data collection took place in November and December 2024, unless otherwise noted.

A4P+ reports can be found at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-peacekeeping.

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- UN Peacekeeping Operations continue to actively pursue political solutions to conflict. This is despite increasingly volatile situations in the countries and regions where they operate, which are further exacerbated by ongoing geopolitical tensions. Many missions, such as MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS, worked to minimize conflict by engaging with national and local authorities, communities and civil society organizations.

- When faced with active hostilities between states, such as in the Middle East and the Great Lakes region, UN Peacekeeping missions will continue to proactively deliver their mandates while doing their absolute utmost to stand their ground, as recently demonstrated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

- But achieving durable political solutions requires strong, united diplomatic engagement.

PRIORITY 2: STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

- All missions' work is designed to contribute to political solutions, even though not all peacekeeping missions have an explicit mandate to advance political processes.

- Seven out of 11 missions have political strategies.

- Eight missions have assessed their impact through the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) during this reporting cycle.

- To support mission planning processes, guidance on mission concepts and plans is being finalized. The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) Integrated Assessment and Planning Team will also provide concrete support to missions to develop mission plans.

- Projects with UN and non-UN partners enabled peacekeeping to protect children, mitigate floods, resolve local conflicts, and complete the drawdown in South Kivu, DRC, as requested by the Security Council.

PRIORITY 3: CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS

- The percentage of women in senior mission leadership remained steady at 37%. A woman was appointed as the Head of Mission (HoM) and Force Commander of UNDOF, the second time a woman is appointed to a uniformed HoM position and the first time an African woman is appointed Force Commander.

- All Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy (UGPS) targets were met, with the exception of military contingents. Peacekeeping continued working to enhance the enabling environment for women. A review of UGPS is ongoing to proactively adjust the strategy as needed.

- The one new unit deployed during the reporting period came from the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS).

- The number of participants in specialized training sessions increased, including those within the Triangular Partnership Programme and at the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Academy.

PRIORITY 4: ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

- Peacekeepers serve at great risk to their safety and security, as demonstrated by the recent and deeply concerning escalation of violence in the DRC, which resulted in the death of three peacekeepers. The tragic death of a peacekeeper in CAR only further underlines the threats faced by UN Peacekeepers. One death is one too many.

- Evolving threats, such as those from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including small commercial drones in Africa, are of particular concern.

- The number of deaths caused by malicious acts remains relatively low compared to the years preceding 2023. This can be attributed at least in part to the missions' implementation of proactive measures, such as addressing explosive ordnance (EO) threats, enhancing casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures, improving the safety of accommodations and launching health-related campaigns.

- Most missions neutralized all or the vast majority of EOs found.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PRIORITY 5: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

- UN Peacekeeping continues evaluating uniformed and civilian performance and taking remedial action, but further efforts are needed. We are revising the methodologies for evaluating uniformed units. The revised methodology for military units will be tested in one mission in March 2025.

- Principal-level Monthly Performance Meetings continue to be held regularly to address cases of underperformance. In the reporting period, it decided to repatriate one company. We are also stepping up efforts to reward outstanding performance. The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Recognizing Outstanding Performance of Uniformed Units was finalized.

- In response to substantiated sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) cases, seven peacekeepers were repatriated on disciplinary grounds and two were dismissed, terminated or separated from service.

- Most missions improved their overall Environmental Scorecard.

## PRIORITY 6: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

- Missions continued to engage in proactive and carefully tailored strategic communications activities to conduct outreach, dialogue as well as to clarify their role and mandate.

- Missions engage across multiple mediums, with radio being one of the most effective in peacekeeping contexts.

- In response to the challenge of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, missions engaged in early warning and proactive responses.

PRIORITY 7: COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES

- Host authorities continue to violate Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Status of Mission Agreements (SOMA), although the number of violations was down this cycle. These violations hinder missions' ability to implement their mandates, including by affecting the movement of personnel, and can endanger the safety and security of peacekeepers.

- Initial indications suggest that strong mission coordination with host governments, as has been put in place by missions such as MONUSCO and UNMISS, may reduce the number of violations. Member State support is needed where mission engagement is insufficient to decrease violations and enable the mission to implement its mandate.

AN OVERVIEW OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

MINURSO Western Sahara

UNMIK Kosovo

UNFICYP Cyprus

UNIFIL Lebanon

UNMOGIP India and Pakistan

MINUSCA Central African Republic

MONUSCO Dem. Rep. of the Congo

UNMISS South Sudan

UNISFA Abyei

UNTSO Middle East

UNDOF Syrian Arab Rep.

Map No. 4259 Rev. 28.1 (E)
Feb 2025

Geographic location of peacekeeping missions. *Based on UN Peacekeeping operations map No. 4259 Rev. 28.1 (E). In this report, references to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).*

Peacekeeping missions' budget (apportionment 2023-24) and number of personnel (approved for 2023-24)
Source: Budget for the United Nations peacekeeping missions from 2024 to 2025

PRIORITY 1. COLLECTIVE COHERENCE BEHIND A POLITICAL STRATEGY

Missions' efforts to support political solutions to the conflicts

UN Peacekeeping Operations continued to actively pursue political solutions to conflict and provide environments conducive to peace. This is despite increasingly volatile settings in the countries and regions where they operate, which is further exacerbated by ongoing geopolitical tensions. As the below examples demonstrate, many did so by engaging with national and local authorities, communities and civil society organizations. When faced with active hostilities between nations as in the Middle East and the Great Lakes, UN Peacekeeping missions will continue to proactively deliver their mandates while doing their absolute utmost to stand their ground, as demonstrated in the DRC. But achieving durable political solutions requires strong, united diplomatic engagement.

EXAMPLES OF MISSIONS' EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICT

- **MONUSCO** continued to employ its good offices to support political processes at regional, national, provincial, and local levels. Its political engagement remains essential to reduce the threat posed by armed groups to a level that can be managed by the Congolese authorities. To achieve this, the mission supports the implementation of regional initiatives, notably the Nairobi and Luanda processes, to create an enabling environment for dialogue with armed groups, including to ascertain minimum conditions for their cantonment and eventual voluntary participation in both national and regional DDR processes. Going forward, **MONUSCO** will facilitate the development of tailored strategies that reflect the nature of each armed group. The UN will continue to engage with regional leaders and key international partners to reduce the risk of further escalation and to chart a way forward. Given the M23/RDF's territorial expansion and consolidation of control in North Kivu, the mission's long-term ability to continue to effectively implement its protection of civilians' mandate will depend on the viability of political efforts at the regional level. The continued advance of M23/RDF toward South Kivu is most concerning. As requested by the Security Council, **MONUSCO** no longer has a presence in South Kivu.

- **MINUSCA** continued implementing its new mandate, as unanimously adopted by the Security Council in November 2024, in line with the Mission multiyear political strategy and related mission plan. This multifaceted approach involves continued support for the decentralization of the political and peace process, extension of state authority, including to fragile border areas, protection of civilians, and preparation for upcoming (local and general) elections.

- **UNMISS** promoted political forums to strengthen civil and political space. For example, in Bor, **UNMISS** facilitated an agreement between civil society and the national security apparatus to sit together and understand each other's perspectives.

- **UNFICYP** facilitated dialogue initiatives and confidence-building efforts, such as 11 workshops and trainings for women and youth to strengthen their role in the broader peace process. The mission also sought to diffuse tensions by engaging in political dialogue with both sides of the conflict, enhancing liaison and engagement with law enforcement, civilian authorities and communities.

- **UNMIK** continued to support trust-building initiatives across Kosovo, focusing on promoting inter-ethnic dialogue and combatting divisive narratives. This included support for the Barabar Centre in Pristina, a multi-ethnic space for trust-building among communities.

CHALLENGES TO SUPPORTING POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICT

- **UNMIK** noted that while there were no significant security incidents, the atmosphere in northern Kosovo remained tense with the potential for the escalation of violence.

- In **South Sudan**, delays related to holding elections demonstrated "*political paralysis and inaction*" [1] that could risk the peace process.

- The escalation of violence in the **Middle East** also impacted the work of the missions operating in this area.

[1] Statement by Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary General & Head of UNMISS, 9 October 2024.
Cf. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/statement-nicholas-haysom-special-representative-un-secretary-general-head-unmiss-his-press

# PRIORITY 2. STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

In-mission planning and assessment

All missions' work is designed to contribute to political solutions, even though not all peacekeeping missions have an explicit mandate to advance political processes [2]. Most missions have political strategies, and many but not all have assessed their impact through the CPAS during this cycle. To support mission planning processes, DPO, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Department of Operational Support (DOS) are finalizing guidance on Mission Concepts and Plans. The DPO Integrated Assessment and Planning Team will also provide concrete support to missions to develop mission plans.

[2] MINURSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNMOGIP and UNTSO do not have such mandate, while MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNFICYP, UNIFSA, UNMIK and UNMISS do. Cf https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/field-missions-dashboard.

POLITICAL STRATEGIES

Missions with an articulated political strategy

Seven missions have an articulated political strategy, either as standalone documents or integrated into other mission planning frameworks, namely mission concepts or plans.

Missions are pursuing a long-term political vision while adapting to evolving circumstances. For example, **UNMISS** is finalizing the review of its political strategy to align with the mandated multi-year vision for the mission. The strategy remains a living document, underscoring the importance of flexible planning in the fulfillment of the mandate.

Sources: Peacekeeping missions: A4P+ Reporting

COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (CPAS)

Missions conducting CPAS Assessments per A4P+ Reporting Cycle

Cycle	4	5	6
MINURSO	✓	✓	✓
MINUSCA	✓	✓	✓
MONUSCO	✓	✓	✓
UNDOF	✓		
UNFICYP	✓	✓	✓
UNIFIL	✓	✓	✓
UNISFA	✓	✓	✓
UNMIK	✓	✓	
UNMISS	✓	✓	✓
UNMOGIP	✓	✓	✓
UNTSO	✓	✓	

Not all missions conducted assessments during this reporting cycle. **UNTSO** and **UNDOF** postponed their assessments due to the security situation in the Middle East. **UNMIK** assessments are conducted yearly and in 2024 occurred during the previous A4P+ reporting period.

Sources: Peacekeeping missions, A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 2. STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

Missions' internal integration and with other UN entities

Missions continue collaborating across various mission entities, although there is scope for improvement. Cooperation with agencies, funds and programmes (AFPs) is enabling peacekeeping operations to protect children, mitigate floods, complete drawdowns requested by the Security Council and resolve local conflicts such as those between farmers and herders.

COLLABORATION BETWEEN MISSION ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS

73%

Eight missions reported regular collaborations between most mission organizational units, the same as in the previous cycle

Sources: Peacekeeping missions; A4P+ Reporting

COLLABORATION BETWEEN MISSIONS AND OTHER UN ENTITIES AND INTERMISSION COORDINATION

- **UNMISS** engaged in close coordination with UN entities to implement flood mitigation measures. The mission also collaborated with **IOM**, **UNICEF** and **WFP** on a joint solarization initiative that increased access to clean energy.

- In September, the "*Handover Protocol for the protection and transfer of children associated with armed groups and forces to civilian authorities*" was signed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of **MINUSCA**, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, and the Representative of **UNICEF**.

- Since the adoption of the joint strategy on the progressive and phased drawdown of **MONUSCO** (S/2020/1041), the mission, **UNCT** and the host government developed a joint transition plan (2021) and a joint disengagement plan (2023) to ensure **MONUSCO**'s gradual and sustainable withdrawal from South Kivu, which it completed on 30 June. The highlights from the field section offers more details (p. 23). Moreover, the UNSDCF 2025-2029 includes joint programmes to support national-led reform initiatives in the areas of Rule of Law and Security Institutions.

- **UNIFIL** worked closely with **UNSCOL** as part of concerted, joint efforts to urge the parties to de-escalate and cease hostilities. **UNIFIL** also worked closely with **OCHA** and other members of the **UNCT** to facilitate humanitarian missions in its area of operations.

- The ongoing crises in the Middle East led to improved coordination efforts across missions. **UNTSO** strengthened its coordination with **UNIFIL** and **UNDOF** to enhance the security of the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and Observer Group Golan (OGG).

- **UNISFA**'s collaboration with UN and non-UN partners to organize conferences amongst farmers and herders in advance of the cattle migration system has led to a decline in intercommunal violence. They are doing so even in the absence of the resolution of the final status of Abyei. This serves as a notable example of how missions can contribute to preventing and reducing conflict even without national level political progress.

PRIORITY 3. CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS

Training

Compared to the previous cycle, there was an increase in participation in specialized training sessions within and outside of missions. Most missions reported internal training covering topics such as SEA, fire safety, EO risk, protection of civilians, and conduct and discipline.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING

The Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) continued to provide high-quality training in areas such as engineering, medical services, and camp security technologies. Compared to the previous reporting cycle, there was an increase in both the number of training sessions and the number of participants.

Efforts to increase the staffing of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Academy, e-learning course development and the deployment of mobile training teams by DPO contributed to an increase in the number of trained personnel.

Triangular Partnership Programme

Number of TPP training sessions, trainees, and % of female trainees (compared to the previous cycle)

	# trainings	# trainees	% female trainees
Engineering	7 (↑ from 6)	146 (↑ from 110)	9% (↑ from 5%)
Medical	4 (↓ from 8)	87 (↑ from 85)	15% (↓ from 37%)
C4ISR	12 (↑ from 5)	134 (↑ from 119)	34 % (↑ from 26%)
TOTAL	23 (↑ from 19)	367 (↑ from 306)	19% (↓ from 22%)

Source: TPP - DOS; A4P+ Reporting

Peacekeeping-Intelligence Academy

Number of personnel trained, uniformed and civilian, existing courses, and women participation (compared to the previous cycle)

Uniformed	85 (↑ from 29)
Civilian	46 (↑ from 15)
Total	131 (↑ from 44)
Women %	53% (↑ from 20%)
Trainings offered	6 (↑ from 4)

Sources: Peacekeeping Intelligence Coordination Team; A4P+ Reporting

OTHER KEY FACTS FROM THE REPORTING PERIOD

- Five police-contributing countries (PCCs) received UN training recognition for at least one UN Police course based on the UN Police Strategic Guidance Framework, the same as in the previous cycle.

- Due to the lack of eligible candidates and financial constraints, senior leadership training programmes for newly appointed D2 and above field mission staff were postponed from June 2024 to January 2025.

- During the reporting cycle, nine missions provided 570 training sessions on conduct and discipline. **MONUSCO** stands out with over 16,000 participants across 218 training sessions.

New unit deployments coming through the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), as in the previous cycles. One new unit was deployed during this reporting period

100%

Sources: Integrated Training Services (ITS), Uniformed Gender Parity Team (UGPS) - OCSS; TPP - DOS; Office of Military Afafirs (OMA); A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 3. CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS

Women in Peacekeeping

All personnel categories deployed in the field met their UGPS targets for women's participation in peacekeeping, with the exception of military contingents. The percentage of deployed women has nonetheless continued to increase. UN Peacekeeping has stepped up initiatives to support uniformed women's recruitment, training and to provide them with an enabling environment. The review of the implementation of UGPS is helping peacekeeping to promptly adjust to lessons learned.

UNIFORMED DEPLOYMENTS AND UGPS TARGETS

Deployment of uniformed women over time (as % of deployed personnel) compared to UGPS targets

Military
- Formed contingents
- Staff officers and military observers
- UGPS Target (Formed contingents)
- UGPS Target (Staff Officers & military obs.)

Police
- Formed Police Units
- Individual Police Officers
- UGPS Target (FPUs)
- UGPS Target (Individual POs)

Justice and Corrections
- Govt-Provided Personnel
- UGPS Target

Sources: UGPS – OCSS; A4P+ reporting. UGPS data reflects 6-month averages for most recent data points. Special Political Missions (SPMs) are included.

DPO continued to implement initiatives in support of uniformed women's recruitment and training, including:

- The sixth Women Command Development Course took place in August 2024.

- In November 2024, **UNISFA** and **MINURSO** joined **UNMISS** in the DPO-coordinated pilot network for women in military, police, justice and corrections roles. Early findings suggest that the network is a useful tool to connect female peacekeepers across missions and elevate the voices of uniformed women with leadership.

Priority actions identified thus far in the ongoing review of UGPS implementation include:

- Build initiatives to develop mid-level and senior female talent to strengthen the representation of women in uniformed leadership.

- Continue considering gender an important criterion, among others, in TCC selection.

GENDER REPRESENTATION IN SENIOR MISSION LEADERSHIP

As of February 2025, 37% of DPO-led missions have women in senior leadership positions. Four women are currently leading peacekeeping operations, and three are serving as Deputy Heads of Mission. DPO senior mission leadership posts include five uniformed HoMs: **UNDOF**, **UNIFIL**, **UNTSO**, **UNISFA** (acting), and **UNMOGIP**. Historically, these roles have been almost exclusively encumbered by men. We are encouraged that in January 2025 a woman was appointed as HoM **UNDOF**, marking the second time a woman has been appointed to a uniformed HoM post. This development highlights the importance of continuing to promote gender diversity in these key roles.

To expand and diversify the pool of candidates for leadership roles, the Secretariat initiated additional outreach efforts in 2024, including the Secretary-General's Global Call for nominations, resulting in a record-breaking participation level. The Secretariat will endeavor to capitalize on the success of the campaign to advance gender parity and geographical diversity efforts at the senior leadership level.

Percentage of senior leadership positions (SRSGs/DSRSGs) occupied by women per cycle

Cycle 4   Cycle 5   Cycle 6

Sources: UGPS team - OCSS; A4P+ Reporting

Safety and Security of Peacekeepers

Peacekeepers serve at great risk to their safety and security, as demonstrated by the recent and deeply concerning escalation of violence in the DRC, which resulted in the death of three peacekeepers. The loss of another peacekeeper in CAR only further underlines the threats UN Peacekeepers face. We pay tribute to the bravery of all UN Peacekeepers and express our deepest condolences to the families and governments of all who have fallen. Evolving threats such as those from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are of concern.

The number of deaths caused by malicious acts nonetheless remains relatively low compared to the years preceding 2023. This can be attributed at least in part to the missions' implementation of proactive measures such as addressing EO threats, enhancing CASEVAC procedures, improving the safety of accommodations and launching health-related campaigns.

PEACEKEEPER FATALITIES IN 2024

Every year, we mourn the loss of all peacekeepers. In 2024, a total of 60 serving civilian (30) and uniformed (30) peacekeepers died, the majority from illness (36).

Sources: NOTICAS/UNOCC; A4P+ Reporting. Data for 2024, reported as of 28 January 2025. The civilian deaths include all non-uniformed personnel, including UN Volunteers and consultants.

Total number and causes of all fatalities of peacekeepers in 2024

- Unknown/TBD 18.3%
- Accident 10%
- Self-Inflicted 5%
- Malicious Act 6.7%
- Illness 60%
- **Total # 60**

PEACEKEEPER FATALITIES CAUSED BY MALICIOUS ACTS

The total number of deaths caused by malicious acts decreased from seven in 2023 to four in 2024 and stands at four thus far in 2025. The overall number of fatalities of peacekeepers, including those caused by malicious acts, remains lower than in previous years, but the deaths from malicious acts in early 2025 are concerning. The reduction can be associated with enhanced safety and security measures, including through the implementation of the Action Plan for Improving the Security of UN Peacekeepers.

Fatalities of peacekeepers per year and % of those resulting from malicious acts

Year	Total	% malicious
2017	134	45%
2018	96	28%
2019	88	30%
2020	121	11%
2021	125	21%
2022	96	34%
2023	59	12%
2024	60	6.7%
2025	8	50%

Fatalities of peacekeepers per mission due to malicious acts

Legend: ■ MINUSCA ■ MINUSMA ■ MONUSCO ■ UNAMID ■ UNIFIL ■ UNISFA ■ UNMISS

Withdrawal MINUSMA (end of Dec 23)

Sources: NOTICAS/UNOCC; A4P+ Reporting. Data as of 12 February 2025. Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Data includes uniformed and civilian (local and international) personnel, and fatalities from missions that are no longer active, but which were still operational in the reporting year.

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

ONGOING SECURITY CHALLENGES

- Missions have reported threats stemming from ongoing and escalating hostilities. In addition to the current escalation, **MONUSCO** identified the proliferation of firearms as a contributing factor to the heightened insecurity in the region. In its area of responsibility, the interplay between criminality, social grievances, and political dissatisfaction led to violent demonstrations.

ACTION PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF UN PEACEKEEPERS

Examples of efforts to enhance security within the Action Plan for Improving the Security of UN Peacekeepers include:

- The creation of a mechanism at UN Headquarters to capture, analyze and share experiences related to security incidents in peacekeeping missions. A pilot exercise was conducted with **MONUSCO**.

- Missions' continue to improve CASEVAC practices. For example, **MINUSCA** has a new SOP for CASEVAC awaiting signature and added more personnel for coordinating CASEVAC activities. Headquarters will conduct a mission to **UNMISS** by April 2025 to conduct stress tests and help update the CASEVAC SOP. Missions in the Middle East significantly increased the number of CASEVAC stress-test exercises.

	Updated CASEVAC SOP (change from Cycle 4)	Number of CASEVAC stress-testing exercises (compared to Cycle 4)
MINURSO	√	1 (- 1)
MINUSCA	↻	1 (+1)
MONUSCO	√	0 (- 7)
UNDOF	√	12 (+7)
UNFICYP	√	0 (- 14)
UNIFIL	√	3 (<->)
UNISFA	√	1 (<->)
UNMIK	√	0 (<->)
UNMISS	√ → ↻	3 (- 9)
UNMOGIP	√	2 (+1)
UNTSO	√	25 (+20)

√ Up to date   ↻ In Process

Source: DPO Focal Point for Security; A4P+ Reporting. Data was unavailable for Cycle 5.

ADDITIONAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES

- **MINURSO** installed safety bunkers in response to firing incidents near mission sites.
- **UNISFA** established a new permanent camp and permitted civilians in imminent danger to seek refuge on its premises.
- **UNIFIL** adapted its military contingency plans and implemented force protection measures, including the construction of new bunkers and fortifications. The mission also reduced its presence in the most affected UN positions near the Blue Line. These efforts were critical to the safety and security of personnel during the hostilities.

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST PEACEKEEPERS

Below is an overview of the investigation and prosecution of crimes against peacekeepers. Of note, there has been no change since the previous reporting period (Cycle 5). Data is available from 2013 for **MINUSCA**, **MONUSCO**, **UNIFIL** and **MINUSMA** and is reported cumulatively. In the case of **MONUSCO**, statistics include investigations, detentions and convictions relating to the high-profile assassination of two UN experts in 2017, noting that they were not peacekeepers. For **UNIFIL**, one alleged perpetrator was detained but subsequently released, while six were arrested and indicted in absentia (and thus not detained).

138 (49%) of the reported cases have been investigated by host state authorities

- ■ # of reported crimes against peacekeepers
- ■ # of reported crimes investigated

	MINUSCA	MONUSCO	UNIFIL	MINUSMA
# of reported crimes against peacekeepers	53	54	2	174
# of reported crimes investigated	47	42	2	47

246 (73%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that had been identified were detained

- ■ # of alleged perpetrators identified
- ■ # of alleged perpetrators detained

	MINUSCA	MONUSCO	UNIFIL	MINUSMA
# of alleged perpetrators identified	202	85	7	43
# of alleged perpetrators detained	144	58	1	43

146 (59%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that had been detained were brought to trial

- ■ # of alleged perpetrators detained
- ■ # of individuals brought to trial

	MINUSCA	MONUSCO	UNIFIL	MINUSMA
# of alleged perpetrators detained	144	58	1	43
# of individuals brought to trial	73	56	7	10

95 (65%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that were brought to trial were convicted

- ■ # of individuals brought to trial
- ■ # of convictions

	MINUSCA	MONUSCO	UNIFIL	MINUSMA
# of individuals brought to trial	73	56	7	10
# of convictions	35	50		10

Sources: OROLSI – Justice and Corrections; A4P+ Reporting.

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

Headquarters and missions continued to implement recommendations of the Security Council-requested Independent Strategic Review on the UN Response to Explosive Ordnance Threats (S/2021/1042). As demonstrated below, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), in close coordination with DPO, are further systematizing the response of peacekeeping to EO threats and supporting missions to mitigate the risks to civilians and peacekeepers. Training activities and updated guidance materials completed during the reporting period include:

New and Updated Strategy and Guidance Material:

- Counter-IED Strategy
- IED Threat Mitigation Handbook (pending approval)
- UN Military EO Disposal (EOD) Unit Manual (pending approval)

Training:

- UNMAS Mobile Training Team (MTT) strengthened national instructor capacity by delivering Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT) and IED threat mitigation courses to 67 trainers. These efforts enhanced the capacity of TCCs to deploy well-prepared personnel to peacekeeping missions, ultimately improving their effectiveness and safety while operating in high-threat environments.

- A significant milestone was achieved through the integration/delivery of training on planning for IED response into peacekeeping training packages, including force protection training, UN Infantry Battalion Training of Trainers (ToT), and leadership courses such as the UN Battalion Commander Course, UN Sector Commander, and Force Chief of Staff Course.

- UNMAS **MONUSCO** delivered 72 training sessions to host nation security forces, peacekeepers and UN Staff. These included EHAT, Post Blast Investigation (PBI), Search and Detection, Weapon and Ammunition Management (WAM) and Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE). **MONUSCO** also led awareness training by providing EORE to civilians to mitigate the risk when exposed to EO - see the table below for a breakdown of beneficiaries.

- In the highlights from the field section (p. 23), additional information is provided about the work of **MINURSO** and **UNIFIL** with the support of UNMAS.

EOs, including IEDs, found and neutralized in missions reporting an EO threat environment

Mission	Total EOs found	% of EOs found and neutralized
MINURSO	241	100%
MINUSCA	29	79%
MONUSCO	276	68%
UNIFIL	23	100%
UNISFA	11	100%
UNMISS	479	98.6%

Overall number of beneficiaries of EORE and IED Awareness Training for civilians in DRC

	# of civilian beneficiaries
Women	16,984
Men	16,376
Girls	24,618
Boys	25,737
TOTAL	83,715

Source: UNMAS; A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

Health and well-being

Missions and UN Headquarters, with the support of Member States, have actively promoted coping strategies and aimed to reduce the stigma surrounding mental health issues. The efforts include psychosocial support, training and awareness initiatives, and the establishment of peer-to-peer networks. Missions also sought to improve the physical well-being of personnel and prevent and address health issues. Only one mission hospital reported service interruptions.

PREVENTING AND ADDRESSING HEALTH ISSUES

- Missions implemented monitoring, training, and awareness-raising activities on multiple health-related topics. For example, **UNMIK** introduced an Annual Medical Check-up for staff and their dependents.
- In line with the Elsie Initiative, **MINUSCA**, **MONUSCO**, **UNFICYP**, and **UNISFA** enhanced the living conditions for staff by developing gender-sensitive accommodations, ablutions, recreational spaces and camp layouts. **UNMOGIP** also established gender-sensitive accommodations to improve the living conditions of female military observers.

HOSPITALS IN MISSIONS

Number of Hospitals in Missions by level

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 2+	Level 3	# of hospitals submitting reports	# of hospitals reporting service interruptions
MINURSO	1				1	0
MINUSCA		1	3		4	0
MONUSCO	1	2		1	3	0
UNDOF	1				1	1
UNFICYP					-	-
UNIFIL	2				2	0
UNISFA			1		0	0
UNMIK					-	-
UNMISS	1	4	1		6	0
UNMOGIP					-	-
UNTSO					-	-

Sources: DHMOSH; A4P+ Reporting. Hospitals only submit reports at the 5th and 10th month after rotation. Hospitals are defined as Level 1+ and above.

7 The number of **days** malfunctioning equipment (desktops in the reception area) **impacted the delivery of care** in the reporting period

0 No hospital reported an **insufficient supply of consumables** impacting the delivery or care

0 No hospital reported an **inability to perform surgery**

0 No hospital reported being **unable to accept new intensive care patients** due to the absence of personnel

Sources: DHMOSH; A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

MENTAL HEALTH

Missions adopted a mix of formal and informal mechanisms to support peacekeepers and promote their mental well-being. Specific examples from the field include:

- Missions such as **UNMIK** established a network of volunteer staff peer helpers, trained and certified in providing psychosocial support. These peer support structures offer approachable outlets for discussing mental health concerns.

- Training and awareness-raising efforts were implemented to decrease the stigma and promote access to coping tools. **MONUSCO** developed comprehensive psychosocial programs on combatting stress management, resilience-building, and trauma-informed care, and conducted regular mental-health preventive check-ins.

- Emphasizing the overlap between mental and physical health, missions such as **UNMOGIP** continued to promote recreational and physical fitness activities to reduce stress.

- Missions also reported increased efforts to ensure the availability of counselling, online or in-person. However, challenges in ensuring effective and timely access to professionals were noted, hindering mental health service delivery. For instance, **UNMISS** reported a staff-to-counselor ratio of 3699 to 1.

At Headquarters, the Division of Healthcare Management and Occupational Safety and Health (DHMOSH) of DOS, which developed the Mental Health Strategy for Uniformed Personnel, supported its rollout across peacekeeping operations. The Strategy seeks to make support accessible, diminish barriers to help-seeking, and reduce stigma associated with mental health issues.

One of the means of increased accessibility to psychosocial support is the **UN MindCompanion** web and mobile-based app. The app offers a curated collection of evidence-based assessment resources and tools for uniformed and civilian staff during and after deployment. Multiple missions highlighted the benefits of the app and sought to promote its usage.


UN's MindCompanion
Promoting and Supporting Mental Health

PRIORITY 5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

Conduct of peacekeepers

The UN standards of conduct are the foundation for service in UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping personnel must uphold the highest standards of conduct, which reflect the values of the Organization. Personnel and leadership are accountable for proper conduct, including a victim-centered approach to prevention from all forms of SEA, and, where needed, accountability and support to victims.

ALLEGATIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN

Allegations of SEA in missions by year reported (as of 31 January 2025)

Date of Incident	■ Current year	■ Other	■ Previous year	■ Unknown

Year	Current year	Other	Previous year	Unknown	Total
2017	32	9	17		2
2018	28	16	9		2
2019	33	22	16		3
2020	25	24	13		3
2021	24	36	12		2
2022	23	47	7		1
2023	14	68	10	6	
2024	18	57	19		3
2025	1	1			

Date of incident: Date or period during which the alleged sexual exploitation and abuse occurred.

Current year (example): An Incident that occurred in 2016 and was reported to the UN in 2016 will be marked as current year.

Other (example): Other refers to incidents that occurred more than one year before they were reported. Example: an incident that occurred in 2013 and was reported in 2016 will be marked as Other in the 2016 column.

Previous year (example): An incident that occurred in 2015 and was reported in 2016 will be marked as previous year in the 2016 column.

Additional note: If acts of sexual exploitation and abuse took place over a period of time, the reported allegation will be marked for the year in which the act ended. Example: an exploitation relationship was ongoing from October 2014 to February 2015, and was reported to the UN in 2015, the allegation will be marked as "current year" in the 2015 column.

Actions taken against substantiated SEA cases since 1st January 2010

	■ From 2010 to end of Cycle 4	■ In Cycle 5	■ In Cycle 6
Uniformed personnel repatriated on disciplinary grounds	298	12	7
Substantiated allegations for which T/PCC reported to the Secretariat that sanctions were taken	142	22	22
Civilian personnel dismissed, terminated, or separated from service	57	2	2

Allegations of serious misconduct (non-SEA) in missions by year reported (as of 31 January 2025)

Year	Value
2017	272
2018	287
2019	369
2020	309
2021	353
2022	295
2023	391
2024	310
2025	7

# PRIORITY 5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

Performance

UN Peacekeeping continues evaluating uniformed and civilian components and taking remedial action, but further efforts are needed. We are revising the methodologies for evaluating uniformed units. The revised methodology for military units will be tested in one mission in March 2025. Principal-level Monthly Performance Meetings continue to be held regularly to address cases of underperformance. In the reporting period, it decided to repatriate one company. We are stepping up efforts to reward outstanding performance. The SOP on Recognizing Outstanding Performance of Uniformed Units was finalized.

CIVILIAN PERFORMANCE

7,049 DPO and mission staff members were evaluated. Nearly all either exceeded expectations (37.75%) or successfully met expectations (58.4%), which is similar to the results from the same period last year. 0.1% of the staff did not meet expectations.

Sources: DMSPC; A4P+ Reporting. The comparison is made against Cycle 4 as evaluations are conducted yearly.

Performance evaluations of civilians

■ Does not meet ■ Partially meets ■ Successfully meets ■ Exceeds

Cycle 4: Does not meet 0.05%, Partially meets 0.45%, Successfully meets 60.35%, Exceeds 35.25%

Cycle 6: Does not meet 0.10%, Partially meets 0.32%, Successfully meets 58.40%, Exceeds 37.75%

POLICE PERFORMANCE

Formed Police Units (FPUs) can be evaluated multiple times throughout a reporting year by missions, using a seven-point scale, reflected below. All submitted FPU evaluations are assigned ratings of satisfactory or above. The Police Division conducted an annual in-person inspection, assessment, and evaluation of **UNMISS**'s four FPUs. This process aimed to identify gaps in performance and measure effectiveness against standards, while proposing corrective actions.

Outcomes of submitted evaluations of FPUs per cycle

■ Unsatisfactory ■ Needs Significant Improvement ■ Needs Improvement ■ Satisfactory ■ Good ■ Excellent ■ Outstanding

|	Cycle 5	Cycle 6
UNMISS	Satisfactory 9	Satisfactory 8
MONUSCO	Good 16	Satisfactory 6, Good 7, Excellent 1
MINUSCA	Satisfactory 22, Good 7	Satisfactory 12, Good 6

Sources: OROLSI Police Division; A4P+ Reporting. MONUSCO had 2 FPUs leave the mission during the reporting period, with 6 present at its end. 2 of the evaluations submitted during the reporting period pertain to these departed FPUs. MINUSCA (15) and UNMISS (4) had the same number of FPUs as in the previous cycle.

MILITARY PERFORMANCE

Military units are under close monitoring, including on C2 and conduct. UN Peacekeeping implements remedial measures to support units' improvement. These include performance improvement plans (PIPs), in-mission training, and pre-rotation visits. UNHQ may engage with TCCs to identify partners for training and equipment. Military Skill Validations in TCCs can be triggered to ensure UN standards are met, while repatriation or replacement of units is also considered where needed.

Outcomes of submitted evaluations of military units per cycle

■ Standard not met [0-49.9%] ■ Standard partially met [50-64.9%] ■ Standard met [65-89.9%] ■ Standard Exceeded [90-100%]

	Cycle 5	Cycle 6
MINUSCA	Standard met 12, Standard Exceeded 21	Standard met 6, Standard Exceeded 27
MONUSCO	Standard met 11, Standard Exceeded 2	Standard partially met 1, Standard met 16, Standard Exceeded 10
UNDOF	Standard Exceeded 7	Standard Exceeded 6
UNFICYP	Standard met 7	Standard met 7
UNIFIL	Standard Exceeded 4	Standard met 4, Standard Exceeded 8
UNISFA		Standard Exceeded 3
UNMISS	Standard met 2, Standard Exceeded 18	Standard met 3, Standard Exceeded 15

Sources: OMA; A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

Accountability to the environment

Since the start of the Environment Strategy for Peace Operations in 2017, peacekeeping missions have significantly improved their environmental performance. This is reflected in the tripling of the share of renewable energy in the field, now at 10%. During this reporting period, most missions improved their overall Environmental Scorecard. DOS continued to provide missions with guidance, training and technical support aligned with "*The Way Forward: Environment Strategy for Peace Operations 2030.*"

ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE

DOS evaluates the environmental performance of its missions through a Mission Management Scorecard. This composite index, which is scored on a scale from one to 100, consists of 51 indicators. Below, two of these indicators are reported along with the overall environmental scores for the fiscal year 2023-2024, compared to the data from the fiscal year 2022-2023. DOS publishes an annual environmental report that provides more details on the environmental management efforts of its missions.

Environmental Scorecard of missions for the Fiscal Year 2023-2024, with evolution against the previous results

Mission	Score
MINURSO	76 (+11)
MINUSCA	77 (<-- >)
MONUSCO	85 (+1)
UNDOF	82 (- 2)
UNFICYP	92 (<-- >)
UNIFIL	85 (+1)
UNISFA	83 (+4)
UNMIK	93 (<->)
UNMISS	79 (+4)
UNMOGIP	74 (+2)
UNTSO	86 (+1)

Percentage of mission sites where wastewater is assessed to pose minimum risk, out of total number of sites

Mission	Percentage	Sites
MINURSO	100%	13
MINUSCA	53%	118
MONUSCO	97%	60
UNDOF	100%	18
UNFICYP	89%	28
UNIFIL	100%	48
UNISFA	63%	19
UNMIK	25 %	4
UNMISS	100%	23
UNMOGIP	15%	13
UNTSO	69%	13

Generators fuel consuption (liter per capita per day)

Mission	Value
MINURSO	3
MINUSCA	3
MONUSCO	1.5
UNDOF	3.7
UNFICYP	0.2
UNIFIL	3.4
UNISFA	5.7
UNMIK	0.2
UNMISS	4.8
UNMOGIP	0.8
UNTSO	1.9

Sources: Environmental Section - DOS; A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 6. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Strategic communications overview

Compelling and robust strategic communications are critical to build support, manage expectations and provide timely, accurate and impartial information to key constituencies through a range of channels. The updated 2024 policy on Strategic Communications in Peace Operations, jointly developed with DPPA and the Department of Global Communications (DGC) and promulgated in June 2024, is enhancing coordination and communication across our missions.

MISSION-SPECIFIC INITIATIVES AND ACTIVITIES

Peace Day Campaign: Street art amplifying communities voices on #OurCommonFuture

To mark Peace Day on 21 September on the sidelines of the Summit of the Future, five missions—**MINUSCA**, **MONUSCO**, **UNFICYP**, **UNISFA**, and **UNMIK**—collaborated with UNHQ, local artists, and youth organizations to create murals reflecting peace and security priorities in their respective regions. This initiative fostered local engagement while also amplifying corporate advocacy messages globally.

During the reporting period, missions organized a wide range of in-person outreach events. **MINUSCA** held over 150 activities, many focused on strengthening local ownership of the peace agreement, including grassroots awareness campaigns led by social influencers. **MONUSCO** hosted a youth "capacity-building retreat" aimed at raising awareness about the mission's mandate and its disengagement process from the DRC. **UNMIK**'s Global Open Day on Women, Peace, and Security and the UN Kosovo Youth Assembly were both successful events that fostered meaningful dialogue and collaboration.

Radio continues to be one of the most effective mediums for reaching audiences in peacekeeping contexts, particularly in remote areas with limited internet access. **MONUSCO**, **UNMISS**, and **MINUSCA** each operate their own UN radio stations. **UNISFA** recently launched an internet radio platform. Based on the results of its latest perception survey, **UNMISS** is rebranding *Radio Miraya*, refreshing its news and programming to better engage and reach a wider, more diverse audience.

Missions continued to collaborate with both traditional and digital media outlets, as appropriate, to share timely and accurate information, clarify their roles, and enhance public understanding of their work. During the reporting period, **UNIFIL** experienced unprecedented and intense level of media engagement, with several interviews conducted each day. **MINURSO**, which adopts a low-profile media approach, continued to strategically leverage its *Instagram* channel by sharing non-sensitive stories and images that highlight its work and personnel.

PRIORITY 6. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Information Integrity and Harmful Information Overview

In response to the challenge of misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech (MDH) in peacekeeping settings, several missions implemented regular monitoring and analysis mechanisms. These efforts facilitate early warnings and proactive responses, including through strategic communications.

LA MONUSCO AU-DELÀ DES GROS TITRES

MISSION-SPECIFIC INITIATIVES AND ACTIVITIES

- **MONUSCO**: During the reporting period, MONUSCO, with DPO's support, designed a communications campaign (*La MONUSCO au-delà des gros titres* - "MONUSCO behind the headlines") to spotlight the contributions made by the mission from a Congolese perspective and pre-bunk negative narratives on the mission's legacy. It continued to report on MDH and worked with the Force to proactively disseminate information on upcoming operations and to mitigate risks of harmful information. A MONUSCO *WhatsApp* channel was launched to strengthen outreach to communities.

- **MINUSCA**: The Mis- and Disinformation Working Group led by the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) developed a strategy to address mis- and disinformation, including at the regional level. The mission monitored the information environment with DPO support and prepared reporting alerts, which enable timely preventative and responsive action, including through strategic communications.

- **UNMIK** has been proactive in debunking false narratives through press statements and strengthening proxy communications through partners. It integrated monitoring and analysis of the information environment, using tools such as *Pikasa*. The mission also trained journalists in fact-checking and worked with youth groups to strengthen media literacy.

- **UNFICYP** continued its proactive action, including by providing preemptive media lines on sensitive topics related to tensions within the buffer zone. In October 2024, UNFICYP held trainings for mission and UN system staff, paving the way for the establishment of a working group to anticipate and mitigate MDH risk.

- **UNIFIL:** False or misleading information about UNIFIL proliferated during the reporting period, undermining its credibility and compromising the safety and security of UN personnel and premises. To counter threats, UNIFIL maintained daily contact with international and national media. Mission messaging was bolstered by radio and television programming explaining UNIFIL's mandate and role.

- **UNISFA** continued to build the capacity of local journalists and organized briefings to provide regular updates on activities and increase proactive messaging.

- **UNMISS** focused on countering MDH through human-centered communication and storytelling to manage public expectations, build support, and preemptively address harmful information. When conflict erupted in Tambura, the mission quickly issued public statements, produced dedicated Radio *Miraya* programming and supported in-person outreach to affected communities.

PRIORITY 7. COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES

## SOFA, SOMA and Coordination Mechanisms

Host authorities continue to violate SOFA and SOMA agreements, though the number was down this cycle. These violations hinder missions' ability to implement their mandates, including by affecting the movement of personnel, and can endanger the safety and security of peacekeepers. Initial indications suggest that strong mission coordination with host governments, as has been put in place by missions such as MONUSCO and UNMISS, may reduce the number of violations. Member State support is needed where mission engagement is insufficient to decrease violations and enable the mission to implement its mandate.

SOFA/SOMA AGREEMENTS AND VIOLATIONS

Six missions have SOFA agreements in place: **MONUSCO**, **MINUSCA**, **UNISFA**, **UNMISS**, **UNFICYP**, and **UNIFIL**. **MINURSO** operates under SOMA. Alternate arrangements outline the terms under which the remaining four operate.

Despite ongoing coordination efforts with host authorities, missions continued to report violations of SOFA. The total number of recorded incidents decreased from Cycle 5 to Cycle 6. **UNMISS** recorded the highest number of incidents, although it noted a decrease from the previous reporting cycle. These violations had different impacts on the missions, as illustrated below.

Reported SOFA violations per cycle

Cycle 5 | Cycle 6

Mission	Cycle 5	Cycle 6
MINUSCA	10	4
MONUSCO	27	15
UNIFIL	43	49
UNISFA	3	4
UNMISS	129	110
TOTAL	212	182

Reported impact of SOFA incidents on missions

	Movement of civilian personnel	Movement of uniformed personnel	Implementation of mandated tasks
MONUSCO	Medium impact	Medium impact	Medium impact
UNIFIL	High impact	High impact	High impact
UNISFA	No/Low Impact	Medium impact	High impact
UNMISS	High impact	High impact	High impact

▷▷ No/Low Impact   ▷► Medium impact   ►► High impact

Sources: Peacekeeping missions, SAGE Dashboard (as of 6 January 2025) and A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 7. COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES

EXAMPLES OF COORDINATION MECHANISMS AND THEIR IMPACT

- **MONUSCO** observed a decrease in reported SOFA violations compared to the previous reporting cycle. Leadership continues to engage constructively with the government at a senior level to resolve ongoing challenges, including delays and blockages in imports. Other cooperation mechanisms were continued, including a joint government-UN working group.

- **UNMISS** underscored the relevance of its engagement with key government authorities through the High-Level Coordination Forum, a platform to discuss operational issues and enhance the mission's freedom of movement. Additionally, field offices engaged with government counterparts to manage expectations and build trust. **UNMISS** was able to resolve some impasses through engaging the government in collaboration with the UNCT, as explored in the highlights from the field section (p. 24).

- Since a cessation of hostilities came into effect on 27 November 2024, **UNIFIL** increased its engagement with Lebanese authorities, including to enhance coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces in support of the ongoing deployments of extra Lebanese troops to southern Lebanon. **UNIFIL** also engaged with the Lebanese political leadership and army to discuss how the mission can better support the parties to fully implement Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), including to address the presence of unauthorized weapons and ensure that the mission has unrestricted freedom of movement and access to locations of interest.

- The Head of Mission for **UNTSO** meets quarterly with representatives from the governments of all five host countries. In this reporting period, it further noted that encouraging visits to **UNTSO**'s Headquarters and ensuring ongoing consultations with officials at different levels contributed positively to strengthening cooperation.

- **UNISFA** reported support from DPPA and DPO to keep governments fully informed as the mission continued to reorganize and enhance its supply chains and deployment routes in response to the Sudan crisis. The formal cooperation mechanisms reported were the same as in the previous cycle, but have not met in the recent past.

- **MINURSO** and **UNFICYP** continued to hold regular meetings with civilian and uniformed authorities on both sides of the conflicts. These mechanisms had medium to significant contributions in promoting cooperation with the host authorities, improving operational capabilities and facilitating information exchange.

- In view of its altered operational environment, particularly following the end of the Assad government, **UNDOF** has continued to maintain its liaison with the parties to the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces to reiterate the need to fully respect the terms of the Agreement, refrain from actions that may jeopardize the ceasefire, and ensure that the mission continues to carry out its mandated activities in a safe and secure manner. **UNDOF** has also been engaging with the Israel Defense Forces on its presence and activities in the area of separation.

HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE FIELD

MONUSCO successfully completed its withdrawal from South Kivu on 30 June. It ensured the smooth transition of its responsibilities to the DRC government through enhanced coordination with UN agencies, funds and programmes (UNAFP), the Congolese authorities, and other partners.

Provincial Integrated Transition Teams exemplify effective coordination among key stakeholders. They provide frameworks for collaboration between all partners involved in the transition process, including provincial authorities, the mission, representatives of UNAFP, civil society organizations, and others. Consultations conducted by the South Kivu Integrated Provincial Team were crucial in raising awareness and familiarity with the transition process while creating a roadmap for its implementation. The roadmap focused on several key areas: the protection of civilians, security, strengthening state authority, supporting disarmament and demobilization, fostering community recovery and stabilization, and addressing operations and logistics concerns.

Priority 3. Capabilities and mindsets

With the support of the UNMAS, **UNIFIL** conducted various activities during this reporting period to address EO threats, despite the challenges it faced. These contributed to the safety of peacekeepers, the protection of civilians, and supported humanitarian response and early recovery initiatives. Activities included:

- 10 Landmine, Explosive Remnants of War and IED Safety and Awareness Briefings for 124 UN civilian and military personnel, enhancing their awareness and operational safety.

- J3 and UNMAS carried out a desktop analysis and developed recommendations for the mine action surge requirements for the "*Day Between/Day After*" response. This planning aims to enhance peacekeeper safety, protect civilians, support humanitarian response, and facilitate early recovery.

- J3-CES, UNMAS, and the Geospatial Information System (GIS) section provided technical advice for the development of a new Mine Action Information Management Platform. This initiative improved coordination with UNDP, the Lebanon Mine Action Center, and other stakeholders in the mine action sector.

Priority 4. Accountability to peacekeepers

In **MINURSO**, the presence of EO poses a significant safety concern. The mission relies on support from UNMAS for route verification and clearance of minefields and cluster strikes in isolated areas of the Sahara Desert. In addition to the risk of road accidents due to the harsh and rugged terrain, threats such as sand drifts, and the rare occurrence of heavy rains and floods – seen only once in decades - can still contribute to the potential movement of mines and unexploded ordnance. In a successful demonstration of collaboration among UN entities, humanitarian demining operations have fully resumed. This allows for the safe passage of **MINURSO** military observers to monitor developments while mitigating security risks.

HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE FIELD

Priority 5. Accountability of peaceekepers

Evaluating performance involves recognizing exceptional contributions to peace and security. In May 2024, DPO awarded the second Trailblazer Award. It celebrates the achievements of women justice and corrections officers who have excelled in various traditionally male-dominated roles.

Major Ahlem Douzi of Tunisia, a justice officer in **MONUSCO**, won in 2024. She supports military justice authorities in investigating and prosecuting individuals responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and attacks on UN Peacekeepers.

The social media campaign related to this award achieved substantial global reach, resulting in 29 articles published worldwide. It was also shared on the UN's *X* channel, which has 16 million followers, and the award ceremony was broadcast on UNTV and *Télévision Tunisienne*. This serves as an example of how strategic communications enables all other A4P+ priority areas.

Priority 6. Strategic Communications

MONUSCO maintains a strong presence in outreach and engagement efforts. With nearly 560,000 followers, its *X* account leads among peacekeeping social media platforms. Additionally, *Radio Okapi* reaches an impressive audience of 23 million listeners, spanning diverse segments of society across various regions. Its programmes are widely disseminated through an extensive network of community radios nationwide. **MONUSCO** also recorded significant traditional and digital media engagement, with more than 480 interventions in national and international broadcast media and nearly 490 postings across external digital platforms during the reporting period. The mission's disengagement from South Kivu was extensively covered across its channels, including video explainers and infographics, ensuring clear and transparent communication with the public.

Priority 7. Coordination with host countries

In 2024, taxes were imposed on **UNMISS** contractors, leading to the blockage of imports of fuel and other essential goods for the mission. This situation created significant operational challenges. To address these issues, the mission and the UNCT established a Joint Technical Working Group. This group engaged with the Government, specifically its Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and International Cooperation, as well as the South Sudan Revenue Authority. Additionally, mission leadership held strategic discussions with the Presidency and members of the diplomatic community. Through these efforts, the impasse was resolved. **UNMISS** and its contractors were able to resume the unrestricted importation of fuel and other items that were critical for its operations.

ANNEX

The A4P+ reports are organized per priority area. The seven A4P+ priority areas were designed to accelerate the implementation of the Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping and are based on an analysis of achievements, gaps, and challenges in taking forward A4P since 2018. They include two cross-cutting themes: women, peace and security, and innovative, data-driven, and technology-enabled peacekeeping.

The internal structure of the 6th Report was informed by feedback received from previous iterations. To ensure consistency, each priority follows the same structure. We focus on specific topics per priority area, based on data trends and priorities of Member States, missions, and UN Headquarters. The analysis gathers examples from the field and combines visuals and quantitative and qualitative data to ensure that the findings are tangible to the reader. For each topic, a selected sample of examples is offered, based on representativeness concerns. In this reporting cycle, we added a section with highlights from the field, where we give the spotlight to one story per priority area evoking the work of a peacekeeping mission.

The report attempts to make data intelligible by providing a clear picture of peacekeepers' achievements and challenges on the ground. As most areas within A4P+ are now mandated, the report also demonstrates the headway we continue to make in the priority areas where UN inter-governmental bodies have requested us to take action.

The findings of the 6th A4P+ Progress Report underscore the steadfast dedication of UN Peacekeepers to their mandates, even amidst increasingly complex and dangerous environments. Concrete progress was observed across all priority areas, demonstrating resilience and adaptability. However, challenges remain a reality at a time when "*peacekeeping has never been more relevant and its success more urgent,*" in the words of Secretary-General António Guterres [3].

The proactive support of Member States will continue to play a pivotal role in the success of peacekeeping. A4P+ encourages dialogue and incorporates feedback from Member States into its initiatives. This includes input from the Fifth Committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), troop- and police-contributing countries, host country governments, and the communities it serves. The goals remain the same: to provide accurate overviews of UN Peacekeeping efforts and contribute to strengthening the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

[3] Remarks from Mr. Guterres at the opening ceremony of the 2021 Seoul UN Peacekeeping Ministerial. Cf. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-news/seoul-meeting-guterres-urges-greater-support-peacekeeping-amid-mounting-threats.

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